This article's factual accuracy is disputed. Please help to ensure that disputed facts are reliably sourced. See the relevant discussion on the talk page. (April 2011) For other uses see Concept (disambiguation).

A concept (substantive term: conception) is a cognitive unit of meaningan abstract idea or a mental symbol sometimes defined as a "unit of knowledge" built from other units which act as a concept's characteristics. A concept is typically associated with a corresponding representation in a language or symbologycitation needed such as a single meaning of a term.

There are prevailing theories in contemporary philosophy which attempt to explain the nature of concepts. The representational theory of mind proposes that concepts are mental representations while the semantic theory of concepts (originating with Frege's distinction between concept and object) holds that they are abstract objects.1 Ideas are taken to be concepts although abstract concepts do not necessarily appear to the mind as images as some ideas do.2 Many philosophers consider concepts to be a fundamental ontological category of being.

The meaning of "concept" is explored in mainstream information science3 4 cognitive science metaphysics and philosophy of mind. The term "concept" is traced back to 155460 (Latin conceptum - "something conceived")citation needed but what is today termed "the classical theory of concepts" is the theory of Aristotle on the definition of terms.citation needed Contents 1 Origin and acquisition of concepts 1.1 A posteriori abstractions 1.2 A priori concepts 2 Conceptual structure 3 One possible and likely structure 4 The dual nature of concepts 5 Conceptual content 5.1 Content as pragmatic role 5.2 Embodied content 6 Philosophical implications 6.1 Concepts and metaphilosophy 6.2 Concepts in epistemology 6.3 Ontology of concepts 7 Concepts in Empirical Investigations 8 See also 9 References 10 Publications 11 External links Origin and acquisition of concepts A posteriori abstractions

John Locke's description of a general idea corresponds to a description of a concept. According to Locke a general idea is created by abstracting drawing away or removing the uncommon characteristic or characteristics from several particular ideas. The remaining common characteristic is that which is similar to all of the different individuals. For example the abstract general idea or concept that is designated by the word "red" is that characteristic which is common to apples cherries and blood. The abstract general idea or concept that is signified by the word "dog" is the collection of those characteristics which are common to Airedales Collies and Chihuahuas.

In the same tradition as Locke John Stuart Mill stated that general conceptions are formed through abstraction. A general conception is the common element among the many images of members of a class. "...When we form a set of phenomena into a class that is when we compare them with one another to ascertain in what they agree some general conception is implied in this mental operation" (A System of Logic Book IV Ch. II). Mill did not believe that concepts exist in the mind before the act of abstraction. "It is not a law of our intellect that in comparing things with each other and taking note of their agreement we merely recognize as realized in the outward world something that we already had in our minds. The conception originally found its way to us as the result of such a comparison. It was obtained (in metaphysical phrase) by abstraction from individual things" (Ibid.).

For Schopenhauer empirical concepts "...are mere abstractions from what is known through intuitive perception and they have arisen from our arbitrarily thinking away or dropping of some qualities and our retention of others." (Parerga and Paralipomena Vol. I "Sketch of a History of the Ideal and the Real"). In his On the Will in Nature "Physiology and Pathology" Schopenhauer said that a concept is "drawn off from previous images ... by putting off their differences. This concept is then no longer intuitively perceptible but is denoted and fixed merely by words." Nietzsche who was heavily influenced by Schopenhauer wrote: "Every concept originates through our equating what is unequal. No leaf ever wholly equals another and the concept 'leaf' is formed through an arbitrary abstraction from these individual differences through forgetting the distinctions..."5

By contrast to the above philosophers Immanuel Kant held that the account of the concept as an abstraction of experience is only partly correct. He called those concepts that result of abstraction "a posteriori concepts" (meaning concepts that arise out of experience). An empirical or an a posteriori concept is a general representation (Vorstellung) or non-specific thought of that which is common to several specific perceived objects (Logic I 1. 1 Note 1).

A concept is a common feature or characteristic. Kant investigated the way that empirical a posteriori concepts are created.

The logical acts of the understanding by which concepts are generated as to their form are: comparison i.e. the likening of mental images to one another in relation to the unity of consciousness; reflection i.e. the going back over different mental images how they can be comprehended in one consciousness; and finally abstraction or the segregation of everything else by which the mental images differ ... In order to make our mental images into concepts one must thus be able to compare reflect and abstract for these three logical operations of the understanding are essential and general conditions of generating any concept whatever. For example I see a fir a willow and a linden. In firstly comparing these objects I notice that they are different from one another in respect of trunk branches leaves and the like; further however I reflect only on what they have in common the trunk the branches the leaves themselves and abstract from their size shape and so forth; thus I gain a concept of a tree. Logic 6 Kant's description of the making of a concept has been paraphrased as "...to conceive is essentially to think in abstraction what is common to a plurality of possible instances..." (H.J. Paton Kant's Metaphysics of Experience I 250). In his discussion of Kant Christopher Janaway wrote: "...generic concepts are formed by abstraction from more than one species."6 A priori concepts Main article: Category (Kant) Kant declared that human minds possess pure or a priori concepts. Instead of being abstracted from individual perceptions like empirical concepts they originate in the mind itself. He called these concepts categories in the sense of the word that means predicate attribute characteristic or quality. But these pure categories are predicates of things in general not of a particular thing. According to Kant there are 12 categories that constitute the understanding of phenomenal objects. Each category is that one predicate which is common to multiple empirical concepts. In order to explain how an a priori concept can relate to individual phenomena in a manner analogous to an a posteriori concept Kant employed the technical concept of the schema. Conceptual structure This section requires expansion. It seems intuitively obvious that concepts must have some kind of structure. Up until recently the dominant view of conceptual structure was a containment model associated with the classical view of concepts. According to this model a concept is endowed with certain necessary and sufficient conditions in their description which unequivocally determine an extension. The containment model allows for no degrees; a thing is either in or out of the concept's extension. By contrast the inferential model understands conceptual structure to be determined in a graded manner according to the tendency of the concept to be used in certain kinds of inferences. As a result concepts do not have a kind of structure that is in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions; all conditions are contingent (Margolis:5). However some theorists claim that primitive concepts lack any structure at all. For instance Jerry Fodor presents his Asymmetric Dependence Theory as a way of showing how a primitive concept's content is determined by a reliable relationship between the information in mental contents and the world. These sorts of claims are referred to as "atomistic" because the primitive concept is treated as if it were a genuine atom. One possible and likely structure Concepts are formed by people's (or other) minds while reflecting upon their environment subject to their sensory organs/sensors and the way such minds are in contact with their immediate and distant environment. The location of concepts is therefore assumed to be within the mind of such an organism/mechanism more specifically in their head or equivalent place deemed to be the organ used for thinking (system of nerves or equivalent). However Concepts can be expressed in language and externalised by writing or other means such as Wikipedia. Others hold different views such as Karl Jung who holds that concepts may be attributed to space other than within the inside boundaries of any body or mass or material formation of living creatures. In fact some people even assume that inanimate object also have such property as "a concept" within their own solid structure. The dual nature of concepts Clearly the location of concepts is not decided for good yet but it looks certain that they are related to the external world or the environment of which of course such a living and "thinking" creature is a part of. Thus a concept is started from outside in the relation of conception hence the subject is subjected to an object and has a concept of that object in a black box usually referred to as the mind. Such a content of the mind is then related to the original object that is reflected in and by the mind (for short) and it is also given another form to enable the creature to communicate about his/her/its experience of that object. In case of humans it is usually a symbol or sign maybe that of a language which is then also related to the external object and the internal concept in the triangle of meaning (which is the same as the triangle of reference). Do not forget that as we speak of existence as inseparable from space and time such a relationship is established in time meaning that whoever has a concept of whatever object with whichever name will have the three inputs synchronized. And should he be not alone at that location he/she etc. will also check that what/whom he sees as existing is real "objective" and not "subjective" (prone to various errors) through a dialog with the members of his/her race or community. Conceptual content This section requires expansion. Content as pragmatic role The template below (Empty section) is being considered for deletion. See templates for discussion to help reach a consensus. This section is empty. You can help by adding to it. Embodied content In cognitive linguistics abstract concepts are transformations of concrete concepts derived from embodied experience. The mechanism of transformation is structural mapping in which properties of two or more source domains are selectively mapped onto a blended space (Fauconnier & Turner 1995; see conceptual blending). A common class of blends are metaphors. This theory contrasts with the rationalist view that concepts are perceptions (or recollections in Plato's term) of an independently existing world of ideas in that it denies the existence of any such realm. It also contrasts with the empiricist view that concepts are abstract generalizations of individual experiences because the contingent and bodily experience is preserved in a concept and not abstracted away. While the perspective is compatible with Jamesian pragmatism (above) the notion of the transformation of embodied concepts through structural mapping makes a distinct contribution to the problem of concept formation. Philosophical implications Concepts and metaphilosophy A long and well-established tradition philosophy posits that philosophy itself is nothing more than conceptual analysis. This view has its proponents in contemporary literature as well as historical. According to Deleuze and Guattari's What Is Philosophy (1991) philosophy is the activity of creating concepts. This creative activity differs from previous definitions of philosophy as simple reasoning communication or contemplation of universals. Concepts are specific to philosophy: science creates "functions" and art "sensations". A concept is always signed: thus Descartes' Cogito or Kant's "transcendental". It is a singularity not universal and connects itself with others concepts on a "plane of immanence" traced by a particular philosophy. Concepts can jump from one plane of immanence to another combining with other concepts and therefore engaging in a "becoming-Other." Concepts in epistemology For more details on this topic see List of concepts in science. Concepts are vital to the development of scientific knowledge. For example it would be difficult to imagine physics without concepts like: energy force or acceleration. Concepts help to integrate apparently unrelated observations and phenomena into viable hypotheses and theories the basic ingredients of science. The concept map is a tool that is used to help researchers visualize the inter-relationships between various concepts. Ontology of concepts Although the mainstream literature in cognitive science regards the concept as a kind of mental particular it has been suggested by some theorists that concepts are real things (Margolis:8). In most radical form the realist about concepts attempts to show that the supposedly mental processes are not mental at all; rather they are abstract entities which are just as real as any mundane object. Plato was the starkest proponent of the realist thesis of universal concepts. By his view concepts (and ideas in general) are innate ideas that were instantiations of a transcendental world of pure forms that lay behind the veil of the physical world. In this way universals were explained as transcendent objects. Needless to say this form of realism was tied deeply with Plato's ontological projects. This remark on Plato is not of merely historical interest. For example the view that numbers are Platonic objects was revived by Kurt Gdel as a result of certain puzzles that he took to arise from the phenomenological accounts.7 Gottlob Frege founder of the analytic tradition in philosophy famously argued for the analysis of language in terms of sense and reference. For him the sense of an expression in language describes a certain state of affairs in the world namely the way that some object is presented. Since many commentators view the notion of sense as identical to the notion of concept and Frege regards senses as the linguistic representations of states of affairs in the world it seems to follow that we may understand concepts as the manner in which we grasp the world. Accordingly concepts (as senses) have an ontological status (Morgolis:7). According to Carl Benjamin Boyer in the introduction to his The History of the Calculus and its Conceptual Development concepts in calculus do not refer to perceptions. As long as the concepts are useful and mutually compatible they are accepted on their own. For example the concepts of the derivative and the integral are not considered to refer to spatial or temporal perceptions of the external world of experience. Neither are they related in any way to mysterious limits in which quantities are on the verge of nascence or evanescence that is coming into or going out of appearance or existence. The abstract concepts are now considered to be totally autonomous even though they originated from the process of abstracting or taking away qualities from perceptions until only the common essential attributes remained. Concepts in Empirical Investigations Concepts as abstract units of meaning play a key role in the development and testing of theories. For example a simple relational hypothesis can be viewed as either a conceptual hypothesis (where the abstract concepts form the meaning) or an operationalized hypothesis which is situated in the real world by rules of interpretation. For example take the simple hypothesis Education increases Income. The abstract notion of education and income (concepts) could have many meanings. A conceptual hypothesis cannot be tested. They need to be converted into operational hypothesis or the abstract meaning of education must be derived or operationalized to something in the real world that can be measured. Education could be measured by years of school completed or highest degree completed etc. Income could be measured by hourly rate of pay or yearly salary etc. The system of concepts or conceptual framework can take on many levels of complexity. When the conceptual framework is very complex and incorporates causality or explanation they are generally referred to as a theory. Noted philosopher of science Carl Gustav Hempel says this more eloquently An adequate empirical interpretation turns a theoretical system into a testable theory: The hypothesis whose constituent terms have been interpreted become capable of test by reference to observable phenomena. Frequently the interpreted hypothesis will be derivative hypotheses of the theory; but their confirmation or disconfirmation by empirical data will then immediately strengthen or weaken also the primitive hypotheses from which they were derived.8 Hempel provides a useful metaphor that describes the relationship between the conceptual framework and the framework as it is observed and perhaps tested (interpreted framework). The whole system floats as it were above the plane of observation and is anchored to it by rules of interpretation. These might be viewed as strings which are not part of the network but link certain points of the latter with specific places in the plane of observation. By virtue of those interpretative connections the network can function as a scientific theory.9 See also Abstraction Categorization Class (philosophy) Concept and object Concept car Concept learning Concept map Concept single Conceptual art Conceptual blending Conceptual clustering Conceptual framework Conceptual history (also termed: 'History of concepts' or 'Begriffsgeschichte') Conceptual model Conveyed concept Definitionism Formal concept analysis Fuzzy concept Hypostatic abstraction Idea Meme Misconception Notion (philosophy) Object (philosophy) Philosophy Recept Schema (Kant) Social construction Symbol grounding problem References The Ontology of ConceptsAbstract Objects or Mental Representations Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence Cambribdge Dictionary of Philosophy ed. Audi Stock W.G. (2010). Concepts and semantic relations in information science. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 61(10) 1951-1969. Hjrland B. (2009). Concept Theory. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 60(8) 15191536 "On Truth and Lie in an ExtraMoral Sense" The Portable Nietzsche p. 46 Christopher Janaway Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy Ch. 3 p. 112 Oxford 2003 ISBN 0-19-825003-7 'Godel's Rationalism' Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Hempel C. G. (1952). Fundamentals of concept formation in empirical science. Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press p. 35. Hempel C. G. (1952). Fundamentals of concept formation in empirical science. Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press p. 36. A concept is a system of general ideas targeting the multilateral treatment/interpretation of economic social legal scientific technical and other problems and reflecting the manner of perception or the multitude of opinions ideas regarding problems associated with to the development of one or several fields or sectors as a whole. Publications The History of Calculus and its Conceptual Development Carl Benjamin Boyer Dover Publications ISBN 0-486-60509-4 The Writings of William James University of Chicago Press ISBN 0-226-39188-4 Logic Immanuel Kant Dover Publications ISBN 0-486-25650-2 A System of Logic John Stuart Mill University Press of the Pacific ISBN 1-4102-0252-6 Parerga and Paralipomena Arthur Schopenhauer Volume I Oxford University Press ISBN 0-19-824508-4 What is Philosophy Gilles Deleuze and Flix Guattari Kant's Metaphysic of Experience H. J. Paton London: Allen & Unwin 1936 Conceptual Integration Networks. Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner 1998. Cognitive Science. Volume 22 number 2 (AprilJune 1998) pages 133-187. The Portable Nietzsche Penguin Books 1982 ISBN 0-14-015062-5 Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis "Concepts and Cognitive Science". In Concepts: Core Readings MIT Press pp. 381 1999. Birger Hjrland. (2009). Concept Theory. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 60(8) 15191536 Georgij Yu. Somov (2010). Concepts and Senses in Visual Art: Through the example of analysis of some works by Bruegel the Elder. Semiotica 182 (1/4) 475506. Daltrozzo J Vion-Dury J Schn D. (2010). Music and Concepts. Horizons in Neuroscience Research 4: 157-167. 1 External links Look up concept in Wiktionary the free dictionary. Wikisource has the text of the 1911 Encyclopdia Britannica article Concept. E. Margolis and S. Lawrence (2006) Concepts entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Blending and Conceptual Integration Conceptual Science and Mathematical Permutations Concept Mobiles Latest concepts v:Conceptualize: A Wikiversity Learning Project Concept simultaneously translated in several languages and meanings Concept free human edited website directory v d ePhilosophy of language Related articles: Analytic philosophy  Language  Philosophy of information  Philosophical logic  Linguistics  Pragmatics  Rhetoric  Semantics  Formal semantics  Semiotics Concepts in language Ambiguity  Linguistic relativity  Meaning  Language  Truthbearer  Proposition  Usemention distinction  Concept  Categories  Set  Class  Intension  Logical form  Metalanguage  Mental representation  Principle of compositionality  Property  Sign  Sense and reference  Speech act  Symbol  Entity  Sentence   Statement  more... 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